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Through economic reforms put into place over three decades ago, China has been propelled to the epicenter of the global economy after an absence of several centuries. On December 18, 1978 , the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party voted to enact significant economic reforms argued for by leader Deng Xiaoping. According to Chinese President Hu Jintao, Deng's decision for reform was "a great awakening of the Communist Party." 2 Deng had recognized after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution that if China was to re-establish its economy, build its national power, and return to its rightful place in the sun, then major reforms were required. He further stated that China should follow a strategy of "opening to the outside world." 3 growth is projected to continue at annual growth rates of at least 7 percent through the next decade and beyond. The "Go Global" policy, which was a national strategy, 9 was written into China's overarching 10th Five Year Plan (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) as one of the key areas necessary for China's path to globalization. The policy's objective was to set the stage for certain Chinese companies to compete with the best foreign companies to break through to the ranks of the global Fortune 500.
An increase in its economic prowess is naturally accompanied by an increase in China's overall national power. Yet, China consistently and forcefully rejects any intention to ever use its power and influence aggressively, refuting any territorial ambitions in its pronouncement of its peaceful rise in the world. 10 However, it is uncontestable that China's ODI adds to its political capital and influence, both directly and indirectly, across the globe.
This paper explores China's economic and political strategies of going global as well as the geopolitical implications for national security in political, economic, and diplomatic terms for the United States and other countries.
The Chinese Government Takes an Active Role in ODI
Internationally, China's global status depends, in part, on its membership in key international organizations such as the WTO and other economic bodies. The internal Chinese debate on whether to undertake the effort to gain such memberships pitted those in favor of greater integration into the world economy against isolationist tendencies concerned about the dangers of too much foreign influence. Greater integration into the world economy was clearly seen as a prerequisite for sustained growth of the Chinese economy. Thus, two parallel dangers emerged for the Chinese government and for the CCP. If the government did not decide to wholeheartedly embrace the global economy, along with its threats of increased exposure to
Western democratic values, then it risked lagging behind economically, which was not without its own risks. Chinese history is fraught with economic problems leading to social and political crises. Yet if the government did decide to pursue economic globalization and international interdependence, then there would be the risk of increased exposure to foreign political and cultural influences. This worried some within the CCP that social mores and a diversification of political thought could pollute China and put at risk the Party's monopoly on political power.
The CCP's first priority was to maintain its monopoly on power. Therefore, to mitigate the political risks, the Chinese central government took a cautious approach towards ODI. ODI in the early years was miniscule and inconsequential in global economic terms. In 1979, Chinese
ODI amounted to only 0.8 million renminbi. 11 However, it represented the beginning of a process that at its apex reached $73 billion in 2008. 12 In In China, certain industrial and business sectors are deemed to comprise the core of the national economy. All corporations in these sectors, regardless of their shareholding structure, are required by law to be controlled or owned by the state (see Table 1 ). The sectors include power generation and distribution; oil, coal, petrochemicals, and natural gas; telecommunications;
armaments; aviation and shipping; machinery and car production; information technologies; construction; and the production of iron, steel, and non-ferrous metals. 21 Those Chinese companies involved The Chinese government's worldwide political and economic agenda are key factors in pushing companies to go abroad. With the expansion of economic ties bilaterally and multilaterally, Beijing is able to increase its political clout and influence in those same locations, not to mention neighboring areas. It is apparent that China's outward economic involvement, as observed in its means and ends, is clearly aligned with its global strategy to enhance its global political presence. Business and political (state and party) leaders work jointly to strengthen Chinese relationships with countries and regions.
" It is apparent that China's outward economic involvement, as observed in its means and ends, is clearly aligned with its global strategy to enhance its global political presence. "
Natural Resources and Technology: Critical Components of ODI
There are several common economic denominators in the search for motives behind Chinese ODI. They are assuring access to foreign markets, natural resources, advanced technology and intellectual property.
China's per capita availability of natural resources is relatively low. Therefore, it must go abroad to assure consistent access to these resources. From the beginning of China's going global days, the search for natural resources has been a priority for the central government's directives in Chinese ODI. The focus has been on oil and natural gas to fuel China's growing domestic economy and industry. However, copper, tin, aluminum, iron ore, lumber, and other raw materials have increasingly come to the fore as Chinese companies want to ensure long term access to the materials needed in their export driven economy.
In terms of energy resources, China did not become a net importer of oil until 1993.
Chinese imports of oil have grown from 6-percent in 1993 to over 50-percent in 2009. (see Table   2 ). The country's dependence on foreign oil is predicted to rise to 70-percent by 2020. 31 32 Initially, Chinese ODI focused on relatively low-risk projects involving oil field rehabilitation and development, and the service provisions. Subsequently, CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec expanded their activities substantially (see Table 3 ). 33 The latter has focused its efforts on refinery projects while the former companies have focused on exploration and production projects. In terms of mineral resources, China possesses approximately 58% of the world average of what is required to meet its needs. 36 The country's profound growth and development over the past three decades is illustrated by the percentage of consumption of the world's resources. As the factory for many of the world's consumer goods, China is reliant on raw materials to fuel its In recent years, Chinese officials have viewed the global financial crisis as an opportunity to acquire stakes in international supplies of strategic natural resources (see Table 4 ). The leadership in Beijing fully realizes that the country will need such resources in the years to come and is thus directing investments into these sectors in order to leverage the lower prices In sum, Chinese enterprises are trying to strengthen their control over and their access to natural resources that are necessary to continue fuelling the country's rapid economic growth.
Acquiring overseas assets, for example oil and gas, is high on the agenda for the government and therefore state-owned companies such as Petrol China, Sinopec, and CNOOC are rapidly expanding overseas in order to acquire foreign assets that can help China to continue fuelling this economic growth. However, there is another side to consider. Chinese investments in some areas in terms of infrastructure improvements, improving living and health standards, and regional economic development serves the causes of international and regional stability. Moreover, Chinese economic influence with its commensurate political authority may eventually serve U.S. and Western interests. Despite overall international disappointment in what appears to be almost unconditional Chinese support for Iran and North Korea, the key role of Chinese SOEs in these two economies may ultimately lead to Beijing exerting pressure when their own threshold for these two rogue regimes' behavior becomes too great to bear.
Post-Mao China has evolved into a status quo power. Hence, Chinese interests appear to have benefitted by operating within the current global system, of which Washington has been the chief architect, than by challenging it. Therefore, many argue that China's rise is not necessarily negative for U.S. interests. Conversely, the rise of Germany and Japan in the last century has been deemed analogous to China's current rise. Therefore, cautionary notes for the United States abound, pointing towards a hedging strategy particularly given China's sometime troubling international relationships with pariah states.
" Beijing is seen to have advantages over the United States in that its overseas activities and investments are conducted by strong, wellfunded, and well-connected state-owned enterprises. "
Conclusions
The impressive growth of the biggest developing country in the world is a key economic and political issue. China's commercial achievements abroad connote significant success in other sectors, directly and indirectly. Chinese companies' access to resources, technologies, markets, and elites translates into means of influence and power than can be harnessed for a whole host of objectives that are not necessarily focused on commercial goals only. The Chinese economic position will naturally translate into much greater political power, affecting all other countries, as well as its international relations at the regional and global level.
Objectively, there is no conclusive evidence that the rise of China is nothing more than the legitimate development and expansion of a growing and prospering country. The Chinese actually subscribe to the proposition that their "rise" is more akin to a renaissance as China was the world's largest economy for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Chinese observers are rightfully resentful of critics and cynics questioning China's justification for its "peaceful rise."
Yet, Western observers do raise their own legitimate concerns. Chinese mercantilist tendencies, increasingly assertive international behavior, and patronage of the most despicable regimes on the planet have caused alarm and trepidation. The 2011 Libyan crisis presented another example of China's growing interests globally in both commercial and military terms.
Tens of thousands of Chinese workers, primarily from the petroleum and construction industries, had to be evacuated from Libya during the civil unrest. This large presence of Chinese workers came as a surprise to many international observers. The Chinese government conducted their own version of a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) using solely commercial assets.
However, a Chinese warship, the Jiangkai-II Class missile frigate XUZHOU, was also present in the Mediterranean during this NEO. This was a first for China and did not go wholly unnoticed in the international press and in various foreign capitals. Chinese commercial activities abroad can carry military implications.
